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Abstract
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original private estimate of the proﬁtability of a project. Importantly, only
the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant cannot. We
characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client. It is
a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two
parties (from the client to the consultant or vice versa) in case the project is
undertaken by the client and in case it is not. The main result of the paper
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11 Introduction
An important question in economic theory is how information is transmitted be-
tween strategic agents with diﬀering goals, and what type of mechanisms govern (or
induce optimal) information transmission between such parties. In particular, one
fascinating topic is the relationship between consultants (professional advisors) and
their clients: How do consultants “create value,” and what characterizes optimal
contracts between them and their clients?
In this paper, we put forward a model where a consultant (she) is able to reveal
signals to her client (him) that reﬁne the client’s original private estimate regarding
the proﬁtability of a project. The client’s action as to whether he undertakes the
project is contractible, but the information disclosed by the consultant is not. In-
deed, we assume that only the client can observe (evaluate) the additional signals
disclosed by the consultant, so the consultant does not know a priori whether her
advice made the project look more or less proﬁtable to the client. She may only
make inferences from the client’s action.
We characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and the client.
The optimal contract can be represented by a menu that consists of pairs of trans-
fers specifying payments between the two parties contingent on whether or not the
project is undertaken by the client. If the client chooses an item from the menu, the
consultant agrees to release to him whatever information she has, and the transfers
take place according to the client’s action.1 In the optimal menu, there may be items
where the client pays a fee to the consultant upon undertaking the project, as well
as items where the consultant pays the client whenever the project is carried out.
The client’s choice among the diﬀerent pairs of transfers depends on how optimistic
or pessimistic he is regarding the proﬁtability of the project prior to listening to the
advice of the consultant. In interesting special cases, the client pays the consultant
a positive fee exactly when her advice changes the client’s mind as to whether or not
to undertake the project. Intuitively, the consultant’s advice is valuable because it
may induce the client to take the action opposite to what he has planned.
The main result of the paper is that, while the consultant cannot observe the
“new information” disclosed by her, she can design a contract in which she obtains
1A contract, in general, could be more complicated (for example, it could involve lotteries),
however, we show that the optimal contract has this simple form.
2the same proﬁt as if she could. In other words, in the optimal contract, the client
only enjoys information rents for the information he already has prior to meeting the
consultant. The client does not get any rents from the information whose release
is controlled by the consultant, even though that information becomes his (the
client’s) private information when released. We also show that the optimal contract
does entail ineﬃciencies, that is, the ﬁrst-best is not achieved.
Our way of modeling “professional advice”–where the advisor may disclose in-
formation that only the client can interpret–is new, perhaps unusual, but we believe
is accurate in many instances. For a concrete example, think of the client as a po-
tential buyer of a good (e.g., a car, or a ﬁrm’s shares) who is uncertain of various
characteristics of the good (e.g., the features of the car, the covariance of the stock’s
return with other assets’ returns, etc.). Then, the consultant can be thought of as an
expert who has additional information regarding the good’s characteristics. Natu-
rally, the consultant does not know the buyer’s original value-estimate; neither does
she know by how much her information increases or decreases the buyer’s willing-
n e s st op a yf o rt h eg o o d ,b e c a u s et h a ti sa l s op a r to ft h eb u y e r ’ sp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n
(e.g., what features he values in a car, what his existing portfolio consists of, etc.).
Our question is: What is the consultant’s optimal contract, if the buyer’s action
(whether or not he buys the good) is contractible, but the eﬀect of the consultant’s
information on the client’s valuation is not?
More broadly, our model of consultancy is motivated by the widely held belief
that the role of strategy and management advisors is to help uncover their clients’
own ideas so that the clients can realize what they are capable of.2 Consultants often
only talk about the correct general criteria to be used in decision making (what types
of trade-oﬀs to consider, common fallacies, etc.), instead of the particularities of the
client’s decision problem. By discussing general ideas, industry trends, or similar
cases, they provide useful information to the client: his private knowledge regarding
his project becomes more nuanced. Nevertheless, the consultant may never learn
exactly what eﬀect her advice has had on the client’s objective function. In many
cases, it is conceivable that only the client’s actions are observable and contractible.
This is the type of potential information transmission that we attempt to model in
2For example, Accenture (a consultancy) advertises on its website the ﬁrm’s “ability to act as
a catalyst” to “bring [clients’] ideas to life”.
3the paper.3
The literature on information transmission between experts and client-customers
(see Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1993),
Emons (1997) and the references therein) often treats the expert’s information dis-
closure as cheap talk (à la Crawford and Sobel (1982)). The advisor has unveriﬁable
information, and the question is how precisely she can reveal it if the interests of
the parties are not perfectly aligned, and the client’s actions are not contractible.
Ours has not much in common with cheap-talk models as in our setup the expert
does not know what eﬀect her signal has on the client’s action, but that action is
contractible.
There are other models of professional advice (e.g., the attorney-client relation-
ship) that our approach and results are more related to. This literature is motivated
mostly by the observation that attorneys are paid contingent fees: payments that
substantially diﬀer depending on the success or failure of the client’s case. The lit-
erature (see Dana and Spier (1993) and the references therein) oﬀers several types
of economic explanations for such contracts, among them risk sharing, liquidity
constrained clients, and moral hazard problems associated with the attorney. Con-
tingent fee contracts may also be optimal when there is asymmetric information
between the attorney and the client. In the model of Scotchmer and Rubinfeld
(1990), the attorney has private information about her own ability, while the client
is better informed regarding the merits of the case. In Dana and Spier (1993), the
attorney obtains superior information regarding the merits of the client’s case after
having oﬀered the client a contract. In both models, contingent-fee contracts arise
in equilibrium.
Our research contributes to this literature by considering an advisor (or attorney)
that can make her client better informed about the client’s project (or legal case),
without becoming better informed herself. As we already said, our most interesting
result is that it does not matter whether or not the consultant also becomes better
informed as she discloses signals to the client, she gets the same expected payoﬀ
in both cases. The optimal contract in our model resembles those found in this
3It may be the case that the client intentionally restricts the consultant’s ability to evaluate the
client’s options, and this is why only the client can interpret the consultant’s advice. For example,
the client may fear that the consultant would use her knowledge of the client’s problem to advise
his competitors.
4literature; the main diﬀerences are that in our case, it is a menu of contingent fees,
and that the transfers are conditional on the client’s observable action (e.g., whether
he decides to pursue the case).
Besides shedding light on issues concerning information disclosure and the ap-
propriation of information rents, our model describes features of real-world con-
tracts as well. As the literature cited above points out, attorneys often work under
contingent-fee contracts (where the contingencies may represent the client’s actions,
such as settling or proceeding with the case), and the exact terms of the contracts
vary across clients. This observation is consistent with our model, in which the opti-
mal contract is a menu of contingent transfers that the client chooses from according
to his assessment of the merits of the case prior to talking to the lawyer.
In other real-world examples of professional advice, such as management or IT
consulting and real-estate advising, we also observe fees that are contingent on the
client’s action. In mergers, for example, it is customary for the consultant of the
buyer to demand a “success fee” due upon the completion of the deal. Since the
decision to acquire the target is ultimately the client’s decision, we may interpret
such success fees as action-contingent transfers. A buyer’s agent (e.g., in a real
estate transaction) may end up with a lower commission after the client has listened
to her advice (e.g., the client buys the cheaper condo when he learns that the other
unit, while more luxurious, has features that he ﬁnds appalling). Our model shows
that this may be the outcome of an optimal contract between the advisor and her
client: The buyer’s agent should disclose as much information as she has even if she
is unaware of its impact on the client’s preferences.
In a related paper of ours (Es˝ o and Szentes (2002)) we analyze the auction design
problem where a monopolist can disclose, without observing, private signals to the
buyers that reﬁne their initial private valuation estimates for the object being sold.
That paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing selling mechanism and show that
in the optimal mechanism the seller discloses all available signals (which only the
buyers can observe) and attains the same revenue as if she could directly observe
the realizations of these signals. This result is similar to the one we obtain in the
p r e s e n tp a p e r ,w h e r et h ec o n s u l t a n to b t a i n st h es a m ep r o ﬁt as if she could observe
the eﬀect of her signal on the client’s valuation for the project. The problem is very
diﬀe r e n th e r e ,h o w e v e r ,b e c a u s ei ti sn o tt h es e l l e r ,b u tat h i r dp a r t y ,t h a tc o n t r o l s
information relevant for the buyer (here, the client).
5The analysis of the optimal contract in our model is similar to that of a Principal-
A g e n tm o d e lw h e r et h ev a l u eo ft h eA g e n t ’ so u t s i d eo p t i o nd e p e n d so nh i st y p e . 4
Principal-Agent models with type-dependent outside option have been studied in the
literature by Lewis and Sappington (1989), Klibanoﬀ and Morduch (1995), Maggi
and Rodriguez (1995), and most generally by Jullien (2000). None of the above
treatments applies directly in our framework, but the solutions exhibit certain com-
mon features. Also, naturally, in this literature the question whether the consultant
could gain by directly observing the signals that she controls does not arise, because
that is a question very speciﬁc to our actual model.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the model
and introduce the necessary notation. In Section 3, we derive the optimal contract
for the consultant. In Section 4, we compare the results with those obtained in a
“benchmark” case, where the consultant can observe (upon release) the signal that
she controls. We show that her payoﬀ is the same in either optimal contract. Section
5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Environment
There are two risk neutral agents in the model: a consultant (she) and her client
(he). The client can undertake a project at a cost r,w h e r er ∈ R is commonly
known. The project generates a stochastic ex-post monetary beneﬁt, V = v + s,
where v is the client’s estimate of V ,a n ds is an error term. Note that the additive
structure is not an assumption, rather, s ≡ V −v is the deﬁnition of the error term.
While v is the client’s private information, s is a signal that only the consultant
can disclose him, without the consultant directly observing it. Notice that since s
is not observed by the consultant (and neither is v), it does not matter whether she
reveals without observing V or s, because in the latter case the client can compute
the value of V = v + s. It is important to understand that this assumption–that
4The client can undertake the project without asking the consultant for advice. If his original
value-estimate (type) is below the project’s cost then the client’s outside option is worth zero. If
his estimate exceeds the project’s cost then the client’s outside option is the project’s net proﬁt,
which is increasing in his type.
6the sender of s does not observe s while the receiver does–is just the way we model
the situation where the consultant is unaware of the eﬀect of her information on the
client’s initial value-estimate.
We assume that v is drawn from a distribution F on the unit interval5 with a
positive density f that is twice diﬀerentiable and logconcave (i.e., d2 lnf(v)/dv2 ≤
0). Logconcavity is an important, though standard, assumption in the literature
on contracting with incomplete information. It implies, among other things, that
the distribution satisﬁes certain monotone hazard rate conditions. In particular, for
all b ∈ [0,1], (b − F)/f is weakly decreasing.6 Many widely used density functions
satisfy logconcavity (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989)).
The other component of the client’s ex-post valuation, s,i sd r a w nf r o mad i s t r i b -
ution G with full support on (−∞,+∞).7 We assume that s and v are independently
distributed, and that the expected value of s is zero. This means that the noise in
the client’s value-estimate is unrelated to the estimate itself. In other words, the
client’s original private signal, v, is an unbiased estimator of his expected valuation,
and he has no other private information, for example, regarding the precision of this
estimator. This assumption is made for the sake of conceptual clarity. In Appendix
2 we show under what conditions and how the analysis can be generalized when the
error term (s ≡ V − v) is correlated with v.
What is the “value” of the consultant’s services to the client? Intuitively, the
closer v is to the cost of undertaking the project (r), the more valuable it is for the
client to know V precisely. Formally: If the client observes s then he undertakes the
project if and only if v + s ≥ r, and his proﬁtb e c o m e s
Z ∞
r−v
(v + s − r)dG(s). (1)
When v ≤ r, the client would not undertake the project without knowing s,w h i c h
5The normalization that the project’s expected gross proﬁt, v, falls between 0 and 1 is innocuous
as r can be either positive, negative, or zero. All that this assumption implies is that the project’s
expected proﬁti sb o u n d e d .
6This result is due to Prékopa (1971). For references, see also Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and
Jullien (2000).
7Intuitively, the full support assumption ensures that no realization of V (small or large) can
be excluded given a particular estimate v. This assumption is made solely for ease of exposition.
All our results go through (with more cumbersome notation) if the support of the distribution of
s is not the whole real line.
7would then yield zero proﬁt; therefore, for him the value of knowing s is exactly (1).
When v ≥ r, the client would undertake the project without the consultant, and his
expected proﬁtw o u l db ev − r. By learning the value of s from the consultant, his
payoﬀ becomes (1), therefore his gain from knowing s is
R ∞
r−v(v+s−r)dG(s)−(v−r).




(v + s − r)dG(s) − (v − r)1v≥r, (2)
where 1 is the indicator function. The function w(v) is strictly increasing for v<r
and strictly decreasing for v>r . Intuitively, the closer is the client’s estimate, v,
to r, the more uncertain he is whether or not to undertake the project, and hence
the more valuable it is for him to learn his actual valuation more precisely.
The release of information costs K ≥ 0 to the consultant in monetary terms.
We assume that K is less than the “value” of the consultant’s information to any
t y p eo ft h ec l i e n t ,t h a ti s ,w(0) ≥ K and w(1) ≥ K. This assumption means that
it is always socially desirable for the consultant to release her information to the
client. However, the consultant does not always do so in the optimal (second-best)
contract, as we show in Section 3.
The simplest situation that corresponds to the model’s formalism is where the
client is the management of a ﬁrm contemplating the acquisition of another ﬁrm.
The takeover price is r (commonly known); the client’s initial estimate about the
target’s value is v (privately known). The consultant is an expert on mergers. She
can help (at cost K ≥ 0) the client learn the value of the target ﬁrm without her
actually learning anything about the value of her advice. In the remaining part
of this section, we turn to the description of contracts between the consultant and
her client when the client’s choice of undertaking the project is contractible but the
consultant’s information is not.
2.2 Feasible Contracts
I nt h ei n t e r i ms t a g e( w h e nt h ec l i e n ta l r e a d yk n o w sv) the consultant can oﬀer
a contract to the client. Naturally, the terms of the contract cannot depend on
the realization of s; however, the client’s decision whether or not to undertake the
project is contractible. After a contract is oﬀered by the consultant, the client may
8accept or reject it. The contract can specify whether or not the consultant will
provide advice (disclose s) to the client, and in either case, transfers between the
two parties that may be contingent on the client’s action.8
The general revelation mechanisms that we consider in this section consist of
four real-valued functions on the domain of types (the unit interval): a, c, p,a n d
q. The consultant commits to a mechanism {a,c,p,q},a n dt h ec l i e n t ,i fh ew a n t s
to participate in it, reports his type. For a reported type v ∈ [0,1],t h ec l i e n tp a y s
the consultant an up-front transfer of c(v) ∈ R. (We normalize the direction of
transfer payments from the client to the consultant; of course, transfers may be
positive, negative, or zero.) The consultant discloses s to the client with probability
a(v) ∈ [0,1].I fs is not disclosed then the client has to undertake the project with
probability q(v) ∈ [0,1].I fs is disclosed then the client can decide whether or not
to undertake the project, but if he does then he pays the consultant an additional
premium, p(v) ∈ R.N o t e t h a t p determines whether or not the client undertakes
the project when s is disclosed: he carries it out whenever v + s ≥ r + p(v).9
Contracts with more complex transfer schemes can be rewritten in this simple form.
For example, a mechanism in which the consultant requires a payment when s is not
disclosed can be simpliﬁed without altering the client’s incentives (or participation)
by incorporating the expected value of that payment in the upfront fee.10
In our setup, the consultant acts as a monopolist when oﬀering a contract to the
c l i e n t .T h i si sa na b s t r a c t i o no ft h ef a c tt h a ta d v i c ei sad i ﬀerentiated product and
consultants enjoy limited market power. In reality, contracts are negotiated between
consultants and clients, and usually neither party has a complete advantage in the
process. However, any situation where the bargaining power is shared between the
consultant and the client can be modeled such that at time 0, a lottery determines
who has the right to make the oﬀer. If the client gets to oﬀer a contract, the optimal
contract is simple: he asks the consultant to give him advice in exchange for a
transfer of K.I nt h er e s to ft h ep a p e r ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eb a r g a i n i n g
8The consultant may oﬀer to use a lottery to decide whether or not to disclose s to the client,
but she cannot garble s (change its value if disclosed). Garbling the advice is not a practical
possibility for real-world consultants, and it would trivialize the theoretical analysis.
9From the consultant’s perspective (i.e., disclosing, but not knowing s), a client with type v
undertakes the project with probability 1 − G(r + p(v) − v).
10One of our results, Theorem 2, directly implies that no contract can perform better for the
consultant than the optimal revelation mechanism of the form {a,c,p,q}.
9power is delegated to the consultant, which should be thought of as a subgame of
the larger game describing the negotiation process.
The willingness-to-pay function in (2), together with the distribution of v,c o u l d
be used to compute the monopoly price for the consultant’s services, that is, an
optimal ﬂat fee that she could charge for disclosing (without observing) her infor-
mation. However, the purpose of this paper is to investigate what (how much more)
can be done when the client’s action as to whether or not he undertakes the project
is contractible. We will see that ﬂat-fee contracts are not optimal.
Ac o n t r a c t{a,c,p,q} is incentive compatible if no type v of the client is strictly
better oﬀ reporting v0 6= v, and it is individually rational if the payoﬀ of type v from
truthful reporting exceeds his payoﬀ from not contracting at all with the consultant.










0)(v − r) − c(v
0). (3)
Denote the indirect proﬁtf u n c t i o no ft y p ev in the mechanism by Π(v)=π(v,v).
Note that without a contract, the client undertakes the project if and only if v ≥ r,
hence his outside option is worth max{0,v−r}. Therefore, a mechanism {a,c,p,q}
is incentive compatible and individually rational for type v ∈ [0,1], if and only if,
Π(v) ≥ max{π(v,v
0),v− r,0} for all v
0 ∈ [0,1]. (4)
In what follows, we will not distinguish individual rationality from incentive com-
patibility, and say that the mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if (4)
holds for all v ∈ [0,1].
3 The Consultant’s Optimal Contract
We turn to the derivation of the optimal contract of the consultant. The consultant’s
problem is to ﬁnd an incentive compatible mechanism {a,c,p,q} that maximizes
her ex-ante expected proﬁt. We ﬁrst characterize the client’s proﬁt in incentive
compatible mechanisms. Then we derive the solution to the consultant’s problem
10in special cases (Subsection 3.2). This provides the foundation for the general case,
which we solve in Subsection 3.3. At the end of the section we illustrate our ﬁndings
by numerical examples.
3.1 Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Let X(v) denote the probability that client type v, reporting his type truthfully,
undertakes the project in mechanism {a,c,p,q}.T h a ti s ,
X(v)=a(v)[1− G(r + p(v) − v)] + (1 − a(v))q(v).( 5 )
In the following lemma, ﬁrst, we provide necessary conditions for the incentive com-
patibility of a mechanism. It turns out that in any incentive compatible contract,
the client’s indirect proﬁt can be expressed in a familiar way as the proﬁto ft h e
lowest type plus the integral, over types lower than the client’s actual type, of the
probability of undertaking the project. We also provide (stronger) conditions that
are suﬃcient for the incentive compatibility of a mechanism. We will use the results
of the lemma by looking for the optimal mechanism among all mechanisms that
satisfy the necessary conditions of incentive compatibility, and then we show that
the optimal contract satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions.11
The proofs of all lemmas are collected in Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 If a mechanism {a,c,p,q} is incentive compatible then X is weakly in-






Π(v) ≥ max{0,v− r}. (7)
Conversely, if a = 1v∈[v,¯ v] with v <r<¯ v, p is weakly decreasing, q = 1v≥r,a n d
(6)—(7) hold, then the mechanism is incentive compatible.
11It may be interesting to note that (6), (7) and the monotonicity of X are not suﬃcient for
incentive compatibility. For example, one can show that if a(v)=1for all v in a ball around r
then p has to be weakly decreasing at r.
11Notice that the premium function, p, may introduce distortion in the client’s
decision. When s is disclosed to the client, he undertakes the project if and only
if v + s exceeds r + p(v), which results in ineﬃciency whenever p(v) 6=0 .( W h e n
s is not disclosed, a similar distortion is introduced if q(v) 6= 1v≥r for some v.) A
decreasing premium function discriminates among diﬀerent types of the client in a
particular way: a higher type with the same ex-post valuation may undertake the
project while a lower type may not. The lemma also states that the client’s proﬁt
function must start at v =0from a non-negative level Π(0), and must never go below
his participation constraint: Π(v) ≥ max{0,v− r} for all v ∈ [0,1]. By incentive
compatibility, the slope of Π at any point v must coincide with the probability that
client type v undertakes the project. For example, if the client reporting v gets to
learn s for sure (a(v)=1 )t h e nt h es l o p eo fΠ at v is X(v)=1− G(r + p(v) − v).
The signiﬁcance of the lemma is that with its help (using the necessary condi-
tions), we can characterize the expected payoﬀ of the consultant in any incentive






















The consultant’s expected payoﬀ is the diﬀerence between the social surplus and the
client’s proﬁt. The interim social surplus is Es
£
(v + s − r)1v+s≥r+p(v)
¤
− K when
s is disclosed, and q(v)(v − r) when it is not. Therefore, in the mechanism the








(v + s − r)dG(s) − K
¸






(1 − F(v))X(v)dF(v) − Π(0).





















dF(v) − Π(0). (8)
In the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 we will refer to this formula for the
consultant’s expected payoﬀ, while in the proof of Lemma 3 we will derive a diﬀerent
one based on the results of Lemma 1.
In the rest of the section, using the results of Lemma 1, we replace c (the fee
function) with Π (the client’s indirect proﬁt function). Converting {a,Π,p,q} back
into the form {a,c,p,q} is straightforward, and we will do that after deriving the
optimal mechanism.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis of the Consultant’s Problem
We now characterize the consultant’s optimal contract in certain special cases, which
include cases when either r ≥ 1 or r ≤ 0 (see Lemmas 2 and 3 below). The results
for these special cases form the basis of the derivation of the optimal contract for
the general case (r ∈ R) in Subsection 3.3.
In order to discuss the special cases, we introduce the following notation. Let










That is, FL and FH are the cumulative distribution functions of the client’s valuation
conditional on v falling into the intervals L =[ 0 ,v ∗],a n dH =[ v∗,1], respectively.
Also, let fL = f/F(v∗) on L and fH = f/(1 − F(v∗)) on H,t h a ti s ,fL and fH are
the conditional densities on the respective domains. These densities are logconcave
because f is logconcave.
13In the proof of Theorem 1 (Subsection 3.3), we will need general formulas for
the consultant’s expected payoﬀ coming from client-types v ∈ [0,v∗] and v ∈ [v∗,1]
for an appropriate v∗, when the mechanism is incentive compatible for all v ∈ [0,1].
To this end, we now characterize mechanisms that are incentive compatible for all
v ∈ [0,1] and maximize the consultant’s expected payoﬀ conditional v belonging to
L (and H, respectively) in certain cases. Since we require incentive compatibility on
the whole unit interval, we can use the results of Lemma 1. However, we compute
and maximize the consultant’s proﬁt as if she faced a buyer with v ∈ L and v ∈ H,
respectively. (For the purposes of this subsection, one may think of v∗ as one of the
endpoints of the unit interval. We exploit the fact that v∗ can take intermediate
values only in the proof of Theorem 1.)












∗ − r}. (11)
Then, the mechanism that is incentive compatible for all v ∈ [0,1] and maximizes
the consultant’s payoﬀ conditional on v ∈ [0,v ∗] is characterized by a = 1v∈[v,v∗] with





r+p(v)−v [v + s − r − p(v)]dG(s) ≥ K
o
, (12)
p =( 1− FL)/fL, q = 1v≥r, and (6) with Π(0) = 0 and X deﬁned by (5).
If condition (11) holds then the solution to the problem can be summarized in
words as follows. The signal is disclosed with probability one to high types of the
client (v>v ) and is never disclosed to low types (v<v ). If s is not disclosed then
the client is instructed to carry out the project whenever v ≥ r (i.e., the consultant
does not interfere with his choice). In contrast, if s is disclosed, the premium function
introduces some distortion as it equals the inverse hazard rate of the distribution of
v, which is positive and weakly decreasing in v.
When v∗ =1and r ≥ 1, inequality (11) automatically holds. Therefore, we have
found the solution to the consultant’s problem for the special case when r ≥ 1.
The optimal mechanism when r ≥ 0 and (11) hold, characterized by Lemma 2
with v∗ =1 , is illustrated in Figure 1. The ﬁgure depicts the indirect proﬁt function
















Figure 1: Client’s proﬁt in the optimal mechanism, p =( 1− F)/f
In the situation shown in Figure 1, those types of the client that fall below the
threshold v do not get so observe s, never undertake the project, and get zero
proﬁt. If the client’s original value-estimate is above the threshold, v>v ,t h e nt h e
consultant discloses s to him, and the probability that he undertakes the project
becomes 1−G(r+(1−F(v))/f(v)−v). This is also the slope of the client’s indirect
proﬁt function. Since the slope is between zero and one and (11) holds, the proﬁt
function never falls below the value of the outside option.
Now we derive the optimal contract in another special case.
Lemma 3 Let v∗ ∈ [0,1]. Suppose that r ≤ 1 and












∗ − r}. (13)
Then, the mechanism that is incentive compatible for all v ∈ [0,1] and maximizes
the consultant’s payoﬀ conditional on v ∈ [v∗,1] is characterized by a = 1v∈[v∗,¯ v] with





−∞ (r + p(v) − v − s)dG(s) ≥ K
o
, (14)
p = −FH/fH, q = 1v≥r,a n d( 6 )w i t hΠ(1) = 1 − r and X deﬁned by (5).
In words, if condition (13) holds then the solutions is the following. The signal is
always disclosed to low types of the client (v<¯ v) and is never disclosed to high types
(v>¯ v). If s is not disclosed then the client is instructed to carry out the project
whenever v ≥ r.I f s is disclosed, the premium at which the client can undertake
15the project is negative and weakly decreasing in v as it equals −F(v)/f(v).
When r ≤ 0 and v∗ =0 , (13) automatically holds. Therefore, we have found the
solution to the consultant’s problem for the special case when r ≤ 0.
The optimal mechanism when r ≤ 1 and (13) hold, characterized by Lemma 3
with v∗ =0 , is illustrated in Figure 2. The ﬁgure depicts the indirect proﬁt function























Figure 2: Client’s proﬁt in the optimal mechanism, p = −F/f
In the situation shown in Figure 2, those types of the client that are above the
threshold ¯ v do not get so observe s, yet always undertake the project, and get an
expected proﬁto fv−r. If the client’s original value-estimate is below the threshold,
v<¯ v, then the consultant discloses s to him, and the probability that he undertakes
the project becomes 1−G(r −F(v))/f(v −v). This is also the slope of the client’s
indirect proﬁt function. Since the slope is between zero and one, and (13) holds, the
proﬁt function never falls below the value of the outside option.
The solutions to the consultant’s contract design problem when r ≥ 1, and
r ≤ 0, respectively, are quite insightful and interesting on their own. When r ≥ 1,
the client is originally “pessimistic” in the sense that his estimate regarding the
proﬁtability of the project is always non-positive. He would never undertake the
project without the consultant’s advice (i.e., without learning that s is suﬃciently
large and positive). Note that in this case, the client has to pay the consultant if he
decides to undertake the project: p(v) > 0 for all v<1. On the other hand, when
r ≤ 0, the client’s original proﬁtability estimate is always “optimistic,” v ≥ r for all
v, and without the consultant’s advice he would always undertake the project. In
this case, it is the consultant who pays the client in case he undertakes the project:
16p(v) < 0 for all v>0. In other words, when r ≤ 0, the client pays more to the
consultant if he does not undertake the project than if he does.
In these special cases, the client has to make a net payment to the consultant
when the consultant’s advice makes the client change his mind: if he undertakes the
project while v ≤ r for all v, or if he does not undertake the project while v ≥ r
for all v. Of course, in general (when r ∈ R) the consultant does not know ap r i o r i
which of the two actions of the client signify that he has changed his mind. In the
next subsection, we see how the contract is structured in this case.
3.3 The Optimal Contract in the General Case (r ∈ R)
We now complete the analysis of the consultant’s problem by deriving the terms of
the optimal contract for any r ∈ R. We will show that the consultant always discloses
s to types between certain thresholds (denoted by vb and ¯ vb), and never discloses it
to any other types. If s is not disclosed then the consultant lets the client undertake
the project whenever his original estimate exceeds the project’s cost (v ≥ r,n o
interference). If s is disclosed then the premium function is p =( b − F)/f for some
b ∈ [0,1]. Note that when r ≥ 1, we have already established b =1 ,w h i l ef o rr ≤ 0,
we have found b =0(see Lemmas 2 and 3). The optimal contract is structured
so that the client is indiﬀerent between his oﬀer and his outside option at either
endpoint of the range [vb,¯ vb], except possibly at one of the endpoints, when that
point is on the boundary of [0,1]. Finally, the consultant is indiﬀerent between
excluding and including the boundary types in the optimal contract whenever these
boundary points are inside the unit interval. Figure 3 depicts the client’s indirect
proﬁt function in the optimal mechanism in a situation where 0 <v b < ¯ vb < 1.
For all b ∈ [0,1],l e tpb(v)=( b − F(v))/f(v),a n dd e ﬁne
vb =m i n
½
v ∈ [0,1] :
Z ∞
r+pb(v)−v
(v + s − r − pb(v))dG(s) ≥ K
¾
,( 1 5 )
¯ vb =m a x
(
v ∈ [0,1] :
Z r+pb(v)−v
−∞
(r + pb(v) − v − s)dG(s) ≥ K
)
.( 1 6 )
If the premium function is set to pb =( b − F)/f then client type v that learns s
from the consultant undertakes the project if and only if v + s − r − pb(v) is non-
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Figure 3: Client’s proﬁt in the optimal mechanism, p =( b − F)/f
that it is the lowest client type whose expected proﬁt( b e f o r el e a r n i n gs,g i v e nt h a t
the premium is pb) exceeds the cost of the consultant. Similarly, ¯ vb is the highest
client type whose expected proﬁt (under the same conditions) exceeds the cost of
the consultant.
Lemma 4 For all b ∈ [0,1], vb < ¯ vb are well-deﬁned by (15) and (16); moreover,
F(vb) ≤ b ≤ F(¯ vb),a n db o t hvb and ¯ vb are continuous and weakly increasing in b
with v0 =0and ¯ v1 =1 .

























dv ≤ ¯ v0 − r then b =0 ; otherwise (18)












The integrand in (19), 1−G(r+pb(v)−v), equals the probability that type v of the
client that learns the value of s undertakes the project when the premium function
is pb. Intuitively, in (19), b is set so that among the client-types that the consultant
contracts with, the “number” (Lebesgue-measure) of client-types that undertake the
project under premium function pb i st h es a m ea st h e“ n u m b e r ”o fc l i e n t - t y p e st h a t
would have undertook the project without learning s. The other two lines, (17)—(18),
18take care of corner solutions.
In order to see that there exists b ∈ [0,1] satisfying (17)—(19), ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h e
left-hand side of (19) is continuous in b. If (17) does not hold then this expression
is positive at b =1(since ¯ v1 =1by Lemma 4). If (18) does not hold then the same
expression is negative at b =0(since v0 =0by Lemma 4). Therefore, if neither (17)
nor (18) holds then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a b ∈ (0,1),
not necessarily unique, that satisﬁes (19).
Theorem 1 Deﬁne b by (17)—(19), vb and ¯ vb by (15)—(16). In the consultant’s










where X is deﬁned by (5). Furthermore, if vb > 0 or ¯ vb =1then Π(v)=0for all
v ∈ [0,vb],w h i l ei fvb =0or ¯ vb < 1 then Π(v)=v − r for all [¯ vb,1].
Proof. If r ≥ 1 or r ≤ 0 then the theorem is established by Lemmas 2 and 3.
I nt h er e s to ft h ep r o o f ,s u p p o s er ∈ (0,1). We consider three cases: b =1 , b =0 ,
and b ∈ (0,1).
If b =1then v1 ≤ r (because the left-hand side of the inequality in (17) does
not exceed 1 − v1), and ¯ v1 =1by Lemma 4. Let v∗ =1 ,h e n c eFL ≡ F.N o t et h a t
(12) is equivalent to (15) at b =1 , therefore v1 = v as deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) . C o n d i t i o n
(11) coincides with (17), therefore Lemma 2 applies: In the optimal mechanism,
a = 1v∈[v1,1], q = 1v≥r,a n dp =( 1− F)/f as in (20). Moreover, Π satisﬁes (6),
which is equivalent to (21), and Π(0) = 0, which implies Π(v)=0for all v ∈ [0,v1].
This completes the proof for the case b =1 .
If b =0then v0 =0by Lemma 4, and ¯ v0 ≥ r because the left-hand side of
the inequality in (18) is non-negative. Let v∗ =0 ,h e n c eFH ≡ F.N o t e t h a t
(14) is equivalent to (16) at b =0 ,t h e r e f o r e¯ v0 =¯ v as deﬁned in (14). Condition
(13) coincides with (18), therefore Lemma 3 applies: In the optimal mechanism,
a = 1v∈[0,¯ v0],q= 1v≥r,a n dp = −F/f as in (20). Moreover, Π satisﬁes (6), which is
19equivalent to (21), and Π(1) = 1 − r, which implies Π(v)=v − r for all v ∈ [¯ v0,1].
This completes the proof for the case b =0 .
Finally, suppose that b ∈ (0,1). First we establish that the mechanism proposed
in the theorem is incentive compatible. Note that vb <r<¯ vb because the integrand
in (19) is always between zero and one, and hence the value of the integral is be-
tween zero and ¯ vb − vb.A l s on o t et h a tp =( b − F)/f is weakly decreasing by the













for v ∈ [vb, ¯ vb],
1 for v>¯ vb.
By setting Π(0) = 0, (21) implies that Π(v)=0for all v ∈ [0,vb]. Combining (21)
and (19), we get Π(¯ vb)=¯ vb − r, which implies Π(v)=v − r for all v ∈ [¯ vb,1],
moreover,
Π(v) ≥ max{0,v− r} for all v ∈ (vb, ¯ vb). (22)
Therefore, the mechanism satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions for incentive compatibil-
ity provided in Lemma 1. The only remaining question is whether it is optimal for
the consultant.
Deﬁne v∗ = F−1(b),t h a ti s ,F(v∗)=b.S i n c eF(vb) ≤ b<F(¯ vb) by Lemma 4,









for all v ∈ [0,v ∗],
−FH(v)
fH(v)
for all v ∈ [v∗,1].
Therefore, (12) is equivalent to (15), and similarly, (14) is equivalent to (16), hence





























∗ − r}. (24)
But then, by (23) and (24), (11) holds, and Lemma 2 applies: by setting p =( 1−
FL)/fL =( b − F)/f we maximize the consultant’s payoﬀ conditional on v ∈ [0,v∗].
Similarly, by (23) and (24), (13) holds, and Lemma 3 applies: p = −FH/fH =
(b − F)/f is optimal conditional on v ∈ [v∗,1]. Since the proposed mechanism
maximizes the consultant’s payoﬀ conditional on v ∈ [0,v ∗] and conditional on
v ∈ [v∗,1], it is unconditionally optimal.
Remark 1 If K =0then from (15)—(16) it follows that the consultant discloses s
to all types of the client.
The up-front fee-schedule, c, can be determined from the deﬁnition of the client’s
proﬁt, (3) with v0 = v, combined with the equations characterizing the same in the
optimal mechanism, a = 1v∈[vb,¯ vb], q = 1v≥r, (20), and (21). Alternatively, we may
proceed as follows. If v/ ∈ [vb, ¯ vb],t h e nc(v)=0because the client does not get to
observe s and q(v)=1v≥r.I fv ∈ [vb,¯ vb] then a(v)=1 , hence from a deviation to





[v + s − r − p(v
0)]dG(s) − c(v
0).
Local incentive compatibility, that is, the ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization
of π(v,v0) in v0 (note that p =( 1 −F)/f is diﬀerentiable) and v0 = v in the maximum
yield, for all v ∈ [vb, ¯ vb],
c
0(v)=−p
0(v)(1− G(r + p(v) − v)). (25)
This diﬀerential equation with a boundary condition for either c(vb) or c(¯ vb) (whichever
is more convenient) determines c.I fΠ(vb)=0 ,w h i c hi st h ec a s ei fvb > 0 or ¯ vb =1 ,
then c(vb)=w(vb), while if Π(¯ vb)=¯ vb − r,w h i c hi st h ec a s ei f¯ vb < 1 or vb =0 ,
then c(¯ vb)=w(¯ vb).
Since the resulting fee function, c, is non-decreasing, while p is non-increasing,
a lower premium (paid in case the project is undertaken, chosen by better client
types) requires the payment of a higher up-front fee, and vice versa. We quantify
this relationship in numerical examples in the next subsection.
213.4 A Numerical Example
Assume that v is uniform on [0,1],t h a ti s ,F(v)=v and f(v)=1on the domain.
Let r ∈ (0,1), and, for simplicity, set K =0 . This implies a ≡ 1 and that we can







(s + ε)/(2ε) if − ε ≤ s ≤ ε
1 if s>ε
. (26)
The density, g,i sz e r oo u t s i d e[−ε,ε],a n de q u a l s1/(2ε) on it.




= b − v,
where b c a nb ec a l c u l a t e db ys o l v i n g
Z 1
0
G(r + b − 2v)dv = r, (27)
and “snapping” the resulting value of b to 0, or 1, whenever it falls below 0, or
above 1, respectively. In order to ﬁnd the value of b, ﬁrst deﬁne α =( r + b − ε)/2
and ¯ α =( r + b + ε)/2, the two thresholds of v where r + b − 2v equals −ε and ε,
respectively. Since G(r + b − 2v) is monotone decreasing in v,w eh a v e




1 if v ∈ [0,α)
(r + b + ε − 2v)/(2ε) if v ∈ [α, ¯ α]
0 if v ∈ (¯ α,1]
.
Case 1: r<ε / 2.S u p p o s er + b<ε .T h e nα < 0 < ¯ α<1,a n d
Z 1
0




(r + b + ε)2
8ε
.
Equation (27) is satisﬁed by b =
√
8rε − ε − r.( N o t e t h a t i f r<ε / 2 then b<
√
4ε2 − ε − r = ε − r, so indeed, r + b<ε , as assumed.) It can be checked that
b ≥ 0 if and only if r ≥ (
√
2 − 1)2ε.
22Case 2: r ∈ [ε/2,1 − ε/2].S u p p o s er + b ∈ [ε,2 − ε].T h e n0 ≤ a < ¯ α ≤ 1,a n d
Z 1
0







Equation (27) is satisﬁed by b = r,a n di n d e e d ,r + b ∈ [ε,2 − ε] as assumed.
Case 3: r>1 − ε/2. Suppose r + b>2 − ε, r>ε / 2.T h e n0 <α< 1 < ¯ α,a n d
Z 1
0
G(r + b − 2v)dv =1−
(1 − α)(1 − G(1))
2
=1−
(2 + ε − r − b)2
8ε
.
Equation (27) is satisﬁed by b =2+ε−r−
p
8(1 − r)ε.( N o t et h a tb yr>1−ε/2,
i.e., (1 − r) <ε / 2,w eh a v eb>2+ε − r −
√
4ε2 =2− ε − r.) It can be checked
that b ≤ 1 if and only if r ≤ 1 − (
√
2 − 1)2ε.
To summarize: if r<(
√
2 − 1)2ε then b =0 ;i fr>1 − (
√













r if r ∈ [ε/2,1 − ε/2]
2+ε − r −
p
8(1 − r)ε if r ∈
£





From now on, let us focus on the case where r is inside the unit interval and ε
is small relative to r, speciﬁcally r ∈ [ε,1 − ε], so in the optimal contract of our
example p(v)=r −v. Then, we can easily determine the upfront fee in the optimal
contract, c(v).F o rv =0 , we need Π(0) = 0 ⇔ c(0) =
R ε
r (s − b − r)g(s)ds.S i n c e
r ≥ ε, the integral is empty, so c(0) = 0.F o r v>0,w eu s e( 2 5 ) ,w h i c hc a nb e
rewritten as c0(v)=1− G(2r − 2v). Straightforward integration of this equation,





0 if v<r− ε/2
(v − r + ε/2)2/(2ε) if r − ε/2 ≤ v ≤ r + ε/2
v − r if r + ε/2 <v
.
Note that client types v<r− ε/2 or v>r+ ε/2 are essentially not served by the
consultant, but all other types are.
Our example with uniformly distributed v and small, uniformly distributed ε
(such that r ∈ [ε,1−ε]) illustrates the interesting relationship between the upfront
23fee, c, and the premium, p,i nt h eo p t i m a lm e n uo ﬀered by the consultant. The
upfront fee that client type v is supposed to choose is strictly increasing in v.A l l
client types that may beneﬁtf r o mk n o w i n gs = V − v pay their fee and learn
the realization of the shock. In exchange, the client agrees to paying a premium,
which is decreasing in his type, in case he undertakes the project. Furthermore, this
premium is positive for v<rand negative for v>r . Therefore, in this particular
example with r ∈ [ε,1 − ε], when the undecided client undertakes the project, he
pays the consultant “extra” whenever learning the value of the additional signal
changes his mind, and conversely, the consultant pays him back whenever it does
not.12 This happens in the optimal mechanism despite the fact that the consultant
cannot observe directly whether her release of information actually changed the
client’s mind.
4 Main Result: Comparison with a Benchmark
In this section we derive the optimal contract when the consultant can in fact verify
the realization of the signal s ≡ V − v as she releases it (i.e., in case she decides
to reveal it to the client).13 We show that her payoﬀ is the same as in the optimal
contract of the previous section, where she could not observe s but could only
contract on the client’s action. This result, Theorem 2, is the main result of the
paper.
When the consultant can verify the value of s as it is released by her, and can
contract on the client’s action as well, we can represent a contract by a truthful
revelation mechanism consisting of four functions, d∗ :[ 0 ,1] → R, a∗,q∗ :[ 0 ,1] →
[0,1],a n dx∗ :[ 0 ,1] × R → [0,1]. In this mechanism, ﬁrst, the client reports his
type, v, and gives an unconditional transfer d∗(v) to the consultant. The consultant
checks the value of s (incurring cost K) with probability a∗(v), and instructs the
client to undertake the project with probability either q∗(v),i nc a s es h ed i dn o tl e a r n
s,o rx∗(v,s), in case she did, respectively.14 Incentive compatibility of a mechanism
12We made the same observation in the general model for r>1, and r<0, when we found that
p = −F/f <0,a n dp =( 1− F)/f > 0, in these two cases respectively.
13The benchmark case is somewhat similar (at least in spirit, if not in the details) to the model
of Dana and Spier (1993), where the attorney becomes more informed than the client after the
contract is signed.
14We will use “starred” symbols throughout this section to avoid confusion with notation used
24{a∗,d ∗,x ∗,q∗} means that no client type v has an incentive to report v0 6= v,f o ra l l
v,v0 ∈ [0,1].
Deﬁne the client’s overall probability of undertaking the project with truthfully

























Finally, let Π∗(v)=π∗(v,v) denote the client’s indirect proﬁt function.
Incentive compatibility with participation requires Π∗(v) ≥ max{π∗(v,v0),v−
r,0} for all v,v0 ∈ [0,1]. We have the following counterpart to Lemma 1 for the case
when the consultant can verify the realization of s.
Lemma 5 Assume the consultant can observe and contract on s ≡ V −v.Am e c h -
anism {a∗,d ∗,x ∗,q∗} is incentive compatible if and only if X∗ is weakly increasing










∗(v) ≥ max{0,v− r}. (31)
This lemma allows us to characterize the consultant’s expected payoﬀ in any
incentive compatible mechanism. First, the client’s ex-ante expected proﬁti na n


























in the previous section.
25T h ec o n s u l t a n t ’ se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ,w h i c hi st h ed i ﬀerence between the social surplus




















































The ﬁnal step before characterizing the optimal mechanism in the benchmark is
to prove
Lemma 6 Assume the consultant can observe and contract on s. In the optimal
mechanism, for all v ∈ [0,1] with a(v) > 0, there exists sv ∈ (−∞,∞) such that
x∗(v,s)=1s≥sv almost everywhere.
In words, for a given type-announcement of the client, the consultant will ask him
to carry out the project with a suﬃciently high realization of s and not otherwise.
The intuition behind this result is that once the client is induced to (truthfully) re-
port v, the consultant has no reason to ban the client from undertaking a high-value
(high-s) project while asking him to undertake a less valuable (low-s) one, because
she can appropriate the eﬃciency gains due to directly knowing the realization of s.
The interesting consequence of the last lemma is the following. For all v ∈ [0,1]




1 if s ≥ r + p∗(v) − v,
0 otherwise.
(33)
That is, in the optimal mechanism the rule specifying whether or not the client
should undertake the project can be implemented via a premium function–a trans-
fer that takes place whenever the client undertakes the project and is contingent
only on the client’s type (and not the realization of s).
26Now we are ready to prove our main result. We show that the consultant cannot
be made better oﬀ (relative to her optimal contract seen in Section 3) even if she
ﬁn d so u tt h ev a l u eo fs as she reveals it. In other words, compared to the optimal
contract with unobservable s (see Theorem 1), the consultant cannot obtain a higher
expected payoﬀ even if the signal that she can release becomes observable.
Theorem 2 Assume that the consultant can observe and contract on s.I n t h e
optimal mechanism, the consultant’s expected payoﬀ is the same as in the optimal
mechanism where the realization of s is only observable to the client, but the consul-
tant controls the disclosure of s and the client’s action is contractible.
Proof. Suppose that mechanism {a∗,d ∗,x ∗,q ∗} is incentive compatible and in-
dividually rational under observable and contractible s. The consultant’s expected






























This expression is equivalent to W in (8), which is the consultant’s payoﬀ in any
mechanism that satisﬁes the necessary conditions of incentive compatibility under
unobservable s given in Lemma 1. From Theorem 1, we know that this is maximized
in a∗, p∗, q∗ and Π∗(0) by setting a∗ =1 v∈[vb,¯ vb], p∗ =( b − F)/f, q∗ = 1v≥r,a n d
Π∗(0) where b satisﬁes (17)—(19), and vb, ¯ vb are given by (15)—(16). Set x∗(v,s)
according to (33), which implies by (28)
X
∗(v)=a





∗(v)=c(v)+( 1− G(r + p(v) − v))p(v).( 3 4 )
The necessary conditions of incentive compatibility of any mechanism under ob-
servable and contractible s (see Lemma 5) are the same as those given in Lemma
1u n d e runobservable s. Therefore, the mechanism {a∗,d ∗,p ∗,q∗} maximizes the
consultant’s objective among all incentive compatible mechanisms under observable
27and contractible s, and yields the same payoﬀ for the consultant as the optimal
mechanism of Theorem 1.
The only remaining question is whether the mechanism deﬁned above is incentive
compatible under observable and contractible s. This is clear, however, as the
conditions given in Lemma 5, which this mechanism satisﬁes, are both necessary
and suﬃcient for incentive compatibility. This completes the proof.
5 Conclusions
We analyzed a model of the advisor—client relationship where the role of the advisor
i st h a ts h ec a nd i s c l o s e“ c l u e s ”t ot h ec l i e n tt h a to n l yh e( t h ec l i e n t )c a nu n d e r s t a n d .
These clues, or signals, reﬁne the client’s original private estimate regarding the
proﬁtability of the client’s project. We assumed that the client’s action (whether or
not he undertakes the project) is contractible, therefore the consultant can oﬀer a
deal where the client pays her diﬀerently depending on whether he undertakes the
project upon evaluating her advice. We derived the consultant’s optimal contract,
which can be thought of as a menu of such transfer pairs. Some items on the menu
may require the client to pay more if he undertakes the project, other items may
require higher payments if he does not. The consultant discloses the additional
signals only if the client agrees to one of the items.
In general, in the optimal contract, only clients with value estimates between
certain thresholds take up the consultant’s oﬀer. Among those that do, clients with
higher estimates choose transfer pairs where the signed diﬀerence between what they
have to pay upon undertaking the project and upon not undertaking it are smaller.
In interesting special cases of the model the optimal contract can be interpreted as
one where the client pays the consultant more whenever her advice has made him
change his mind whether to undertake the project.
The most interesting ﬁnding, we believe, is that the consultant’s payoﬀ in the
optimal contract is the same as if she could in fact “decipher her own clues”, that
is, as if she knew how the client’s value estimate changed by her advice. Even if the
consultant is ignorant regarding how her advice aﬀects her client, as long as she has
the power to design their contract and can condition it on the decision of the client,
she can do just as well as if she understood the precise eﬀect of her advice.
28Appendix 1: Omitted Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (Necessity.) Assume {a,c,p,q} is incentive compatible. In
the rest of the proof, consider arbitrary v,v0 ∈ [0,1] such that v<v 0.N o t et h a t( 7 )
is the participation constraint, which is necessary for all v.
















0)(1− G(r + p(v
0) − v













The ﬁrst two lines of the above expression for π(v,v0) give exactly Π(v0),t h et h i r d
line equals (v−v0)X(v0), and the fourth line is nonnegative, hence the inequality on






(v + s − r − p(v))dG(s)
+(1 − a(v))q(v)(v − r) − c(v)
+(v





0 + s − r − p(v))dG(s)
≥ Π(v)+( v
0 − v)X(v).
Incentive compatibility requires Π(v) ≥ π(v,v0) and Π(v0) ≥ π(v0,v), therefore
(v
0 − v)X(v) ≤ Π(v
0) − Π(v) < (v
0 − v)X(v
0).






29From this, X is weakly increasing, and Π is diﬀerentiable with dΠ(v)/dv = X(v)
almost everywhere. Since X(v) ∈ [0,1] for all v, Π is Lipschitz-continuous by (35),
therefore Π is integrable, and (6) follows.
(Suﬃciency.) Assume that (6)—(7) hold, a = 1v∈[v,¯ v] for some v <r<¯ v, q =
1v≥r,a n dp is weakly decreasing.
Note that π(v,v0)=m a x {0,v− r} for all v0 / ∈ [v, ¯ v], therefore, by (7), no type
v ∈ [0,1] has an incentive to deviate to any v0 / ∈ [v, ¯ v].






(v + s − r − p(v
0))dG(s) − c(v
0).

















0 + s + v − v







where, on the last line, we used the identity (true for all v0 and s0 ≤ s)
1v0+s−r−p(v0)≥0(v
0 + s − r − p(v
0)) − 1v0+s0−r−p(v0)≥0(v
0 + s






























(1 − G(r + p(v
0) − v
0 − x))dx.










(1 − G(r + p(v











where the inequality holds because p(v0+x) ≥ p(v0) for all x ≤ 0 by the monotonicity
of p. Therefore, client type v has no incentive to imitate v0 >vsuch that v0 ∈ [v,¯ v].





(v + s − r − p(v))dG(s) − c(v)
−
Z
1v+s−r−p(v)≥0(v + s − r − p(v))dG(s)
+
Z
1v+s+v0−v−r−p(v)≥0(v + s + v


























(1 − G(r + p(v) − v − x))dx.













(1 − G(r + p(v) − v − x))dx
= π(v
0,v),
where the inequality holds because p(v +x) ≤ p(v) for all x ≥ 0 by monotonicity of
p. Therefore, a client type v0 has no incentive to imitate v<v 0 such that v ∈ [v,¯ v].
We conclude that the mechanism is indeed incentive compatible.
Proof of Lemma 2. Steps identical to those that established formula (8)
in the text yield the following characterization of the consultant’s expected payoﬀ,





















dFL(v) − Π(0). (36)
We will now choose a, p, q and Π(0) to maximize (36) pointwise (for all v), and
then check whether the suﬃcient conditions of incentive compatibility in Lemma 1
hold. Set Π(0) = 0 and hence minimize the last term. For a given v and a(v),t h e
integrand in (36) is maximized by choosing p(v)=( 1− FL(v))/fL(v) and q(v)=
1v≥r+p(v).S i n c e fL is logconcave, the inverse hazard rate of the distribution, p,i s
weakly decreasing, hence v − r − p(v) is strictly increasing in v.C a l lη the unique
threshold where q changes from zero to one, that is, η = r+p(η). In order to choose
a(v) optimally, set a(v)=1if the bracketed expression multiplying a(v) exceeds the




[v + s − r − p(v)]dG(s) − K ≥ [v − r − p(v)]1v≥r+p(v), (37)
32where p(v)=( 1− FL(v))/fL(v). This inequality holds for v ∈ [v,v∗] with v <η .
To see this, note that at v = v∗, inequality (37) holds because p(v∗)=0and w(v∗),
deﬁned by (2) as
R ∞
r−v∗ (v∗ + s − r)dG(s)−(v∗−r)1v∗≥r,e x c e e d sK by assumption.
If r<v ∗ then the inequality continues to hold for all v ∈ [η,v∗] as well because p,t h e
inverse hazard rate of FL, is weakly decreasing by the logconcavity of fL,a n da sv
decreases from v∗ to η, the right-hand side of (37) falls faster than the left-hand side
does.15 As we decrease v further, the opposite is true, so we either ﬁnd v > 0 where
(37) holds as equality with the right-hand side being zero, or v =0 . Therefore, it is
optimal to set ¯ v = v∗ and v according to (12).
Note that (11) implies v <r . A l s on o t et h a tt h ev a l u eo fq(v) only matters if
the realization of s is not disclosed to client type v,t h a ti s ,f o rv<v . Since v <r
and q = 1v≥r+p(v),n ot y p ev below v is asked to undertake the project, and we may
as well set q = 1v≥r.
The conditions on a, p,a n dq imposed by the suﬃcient conditions of Lemma
4 clearly hold. The only remaining suﬃcient condition of overall incentive com-














has to meet or exceed the value of his outside option, max{0,v− r}.S i n c eX(z) ∈
[0,1] for all z ∈ [0,1],i ti ss u ﬃcient to check whether Π(v∗) ≥ max{0,v ∗ − r}.B u t
this condition is satisﬁed by (11) in the hypothesis of the lemma.






















The consultant’s expected payoﬀ conditional on v ∈ H is the diﬀerence between the
15When p (which is weakly decreasing) is diﬀerentiable, the derivative of the left-hand side of (37)
with respect to v is [1 − p0(v)][1 − G(r + p(v) − v)] while that of the right-hand side is [1 − p0(v)].








(v + s − r)dG(s) − K
¸






























dFH(v) − Π(1). (38)
This expression can be used to study the optimal solution conditional on v ∈ H.
We will choose a, p, q and Π(1) to maximize (38) pointwise, and then check incentive
compatibility of the resulting mechanism. First, set the proﬁt of the highest client
type equal to the value of this type’s outside option, Π(1) = 1 − r (recall that
r<1). For any given v and a(v), the integrand in (38) is maximized by choosing
p(v)=−FH(v)/fH(v) and q(v)=1v≥r+p(v). Note that by the logconcavity of fH,t h e
ratio fH/FH is weakly decreasing, therefore p is weakly decreasing. Since v−r−p(v)
is strictly increasing in v, there exists a unique threshold, η0,w h e r eq switches from
zero to one, that is, η0 = r + p(η0). In order to set a(v) optimally, let a(v)=1if
the bracketed term multiplying a(v) exceeds the term multiplying (1 − a(v)),a n d
let a(v)=0otherwise. That is, a(v)=1whenever (37) holds with p = −FH/fH,
and a(v)=0otherwise. The inequality (37) holds at v = v∗ (by w(v∗) − K ≥ 0),
and for all v ∈ [v∗,η0] as well because for v ≤ η0, the left-hand side of the inequality
is increasing while the right-hand remains zero. For v>η 0, the right-hand side of
(37) may eventually rise faster than the left-hand side does, therefore there exists
a ¯ v ≤ 1 such that (37) holds on the domain v ∈ [v∗,1] if and only if v ∈ [v∗,¯ v].
Therefore, set a(v)=1for v ∈ [v∗, ¯ v], where





r+p(v)−v [v + s − r − p(v)]dG(s) − K ≥ v − r − p(v)
o
.
This deﬁnition is equivalent to (14). By (13), ¯ v>r .A l lt y p e sa b o v e¯ v are asked to
undertake the project in this mechanism, and for v<¯ v we can set q(v) freely, hence
34we may as well let q = 1v≥r.
The only condition of incentive compatibility that remains to be checked is that
the client’s proﬁt in the mechanism, given by Π(v)=¯ v − r −
R ¯ v
v X(z)dz or












must not fall below the value of the client’s outside option, max{0,v− r}.S i n c e
X(z) ∈ [0,1] for all z ∈ [0,1],i ti ss u ﬃcient to check whether this condition holds
at v = v∗. By assumption (13), it does.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . To see existence, let v∗ = F−1(b),t h a ti s ,F(v∗)=b.
The left-hand side of the ﬁrst inequality in (15) is continuous and strictly increas-
ing in vb.A t vb = v∗, the expression becomes
R ∞
r−v∗ (v∗ + s − r)dG(s),w h i c h
equals w(v∗)+1v∗>r(v∗ − r) by (2). However, w(v∗) >Kby assumption, so
indeed there exists vb such that (15) holds. Similarly, the left-hand side of the
inequality in (16) is continuous and strictly decreasing in ¯ vb.A t ¯ vb = v∗,i tb e -
comes
R r−v∗
−∞ (r − v∗ − s)dG(s)=
R ∞
r−v∗(v∗ + s − r)dG(s)+r − v∗, which equals
w(v∗)+1r>v∗(r−v∗) by (2), and w(v∗) >Kby assumption. From this argument it
is also clear that F(vb) ≤ b ≤ F(¯ vb), which then implies v0 =0and ¯ v1 =1 .
It is easy to see that vb and ¯ vb are continuous in b (no matter what the distribution
of s is). Since the integral in (15) is strictly decreasing in b,a n dt h ei n t e g r a li n( 1 6 )
is strictly increasing in b,b o t hvb and ¯ vb are weakly increasing in b.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose ﬁrst that the mechanism is incentive compatible,





























and hence X∗ is weakly increasing on [0,1],m o r e o v e r ,dΠ∗/dv = X∗.S i n c e Π∗
35is continuous everywhere (which follows from the continuity of π∗(v,v0) in v and
incentive compatibility), we get (30). Since the other conditions were established in
the text, this concludes the proof of necessity.



















































Therefore, the mechanism is indeed incentive compatible.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . The idea of the proof is that if x∗(v,s) does not equal a
step-function, 1s≥sv for some sv given v, then the consultant can gain (weakly) by
removing positive values of x∗(v,s) at low realizations of s and reallocating them to
higher realizations of s with x∗(v,s) < 1.
Let µG denote the measure generated by G on R.N o t i c et h a ti ft h ec l a i mo ft h e
lemma is not true then there is a type v ∈ [0,1] with a∗(v) > 0 and there exists a
subset of R, A, such that
R
A x∗(v,s)dµG ∈ (0,1). Moreover, there exist subsets of









We now show that the consultant can do weakly better by deﬁning a new allocation
36rule ˆ x as follows.
ˆ x
∗(v,s)=0 if s ∈ B,
ˆ x






0 6= v or s
0 / ∈ B ∪ C.
Also, deﬁne ˆ X∗ a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 8 )a n dˆ Π∗ a c c o r d i n gt o( 3 0 )s ot h a tˆ Π∗(0) = Π∗(0).
Note that since ˆ X∗(v)=X∗(v) for all v, the indirect proﬁt function did not change
either, ˆ Π∗ = Π∗. Hence the mechanism {a∗, ˆ x∗,q∗,d ∗} is incentive compatible. How-
ever, in the consultant’s objective function, the term
Z ·µ


















Hence x∗ can be replaced by ˆ x∗ without decreasing the consultant’s objective func-
tion.
37Appendix 2 (for online publication only):
Extension to Correlated Signals
In this online appendix we show that our results extend to the case where the client’s
ex-post valuation for the project, V , cannot necessarily written as the sum of his
interim valuation, v, and an independent error term, s. Recall that the error term,
or equivalently V , is the signal that the consultant may reveal to the client without
the consultant directly observing its value.
A2.1 Equivalent formalizations of the general model
Since the error term can always be deﬁned as the diﬀerence between V and v,
the most general model to consider is one where V = v + z,b u tz (the signal or
error term that the consultant can disclose) may be correlated with v. Suppose that
the conditional cdf of z given v is Gv(z) ≡ G(z|v), and call this version the model
with “additive, correlated signals.”
Alternatively (and equivalently), the general model can be written so that V =
u(v,s) for some u : R2 → R,a n ds (the signal that the consultant can disclose) is
independent of v. The model with additive, correlated signals can be transformed
into this form by letting s = Gv(z) and u(v,s)=v + G−1
v (s).N o t e t h a t s is a
random variable that is independent of v as it is distributed uniformly on [0,1]
no matter what v is.16 We call this formalization as the model with “orthogonally
normalized signals.” Obviously, the distibution of V conditional on v is the same in
both versions of the model, as, by deﬁnition, u(v,s) ≡ v + z.
In what follows, we will ﬁrst generalize the results of the paper using the formal-
ization with orthogonally normalized signals (and general u). We derive the optimal
contract for this case. Our most interesting result, namely, that the consultant can
do just as well in the case where she cannot observe the signal controlled by her as
if she could observe it remains true (under certain conditions) about the signal s,
the orthogonally normalized part of the error term. This makes a lot of sense as the
only “new” information in V − v for the client is the part that is orthogonal to his
private information, v. In order to obtain the results, we impose mild conditions on
u. Essentially, we require that the client’s original signal and the orthogonal part
16If X is a random variable with continuous cdf F then F(X) is distributed uniformly on [0,1]
because for all y ∈ [0,1], Pr(F(X) ≤ y)=P r ( X ≤ F−1(y)) = F(F−1(y)) = y.
38of the consultant-controlled signal be substitutes. In the last part of this appendix
we show what these conditions imply in the model of additive, correlated signals in
terms of the conditional distribution of z given v.
A2.2 Generalizaton of the results
Suppose that the client’s ex post valuation for the project is V = u(v,s).R e c a l l
that v is distributed on [0,1] with log-concave pdf f,a n ds is distributed on (−∞,∞)
with pdf g>0, and assume that v and s are statistically independent. (As we
pointed out above, independence of v and s is not a restriction, just a normalization.)
We assume that all functions are at least twice diﬀerentiable, and partial deriv-
atives of functions are denoted by subscripts. For example, u1 = ∂u(v,s)/∂v.
We impose the following conditions on the shape of the u function (whose argu-
ments are the orthogonally normalized v and s).
1. u1 > 0, u2 > 0 (strictly increasing in both arguments),
2. u12 ≤ 0 (v and s are substitutes)
3. u11/u11 ≤ u12/u2 (v and s are substitutes along iso-value curves).
Assumption 2 states that v and s are substitutes in the sense that as v increases,
the marginal value of s (∂u/∂s) decreases. To see the meaning of Assumption
3n o t et h a tt h et o t a ld i ﬀerential of u0
1 (the change in the marginal value of the
client’s type) is u00
11dv + u00
12ds.K e e p i n g u constant (moving along an iso-value
curve) means ds = −u0
1/u0











In words, Assumption 3 states that an increase in v, even if compensated by an
decrease in s to keep u constant, weakly increases the marginal value of s.
In order to simplify the analysis, assume that the consultant’s cost of disclosing
s to the client is zero (K =0 ), and that she is required to contract with the client,
i.e., a ≡ 1.( I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ta ≡ 1 actually follows from the assumption that
information disclosure is costless.) As a result, we can ignore q. For notational
convenience, normalize v so that it is an unbiased estimator of V ,t h a ti s ,t h ee x p e c -
tation of u(v,s) with respect to s (given v)i sv. We can represent the consultant’s
contract by the pair (p,c),w h e r ec :[ 0 ,1] → R i st h eu p - f r o n tf e et h ec l i e n tp a y st o
the consultant upon contracting with her; p :[ 0 ,1] → R is the “premium” he pays
if he undertakes the project after getting the consultant’s advice.
The client that learns the consultant advice undertakes the project if and only
39if u(v,s) ≥ r, while a client that doesn’t contract with the consultant undertakes it
whenever v ≥ r.D e ﬁne σ(p,v) so that
u(v,σ(p,v)) ≡ p + r. (39)
Note that σ is increasing in p and decreasing in v.M o r e o v e r , i f v increases,
u0
1(v,σ(p,v)) decreases by Assumption 3 on the u-function.
The client’s expected payoﬀ with type v facing an up-front fee c and a premium




[u(v,s) − r − p]dG(s) − c.( 4 0 )
The consultant’s payoﬀ from the same can be written as
˜ W(p,c,v)=[ 1− G(σ(p,v))]p + c. (41)
Note that the structure of the problem is very similar to that of an adverse selection
(Principal-Agent) model with quasilinear utilities. Here c should be interpreted as
the “transfer” and p as the “contractible action”. The Agent’s type has a positive
















1(v,σ(p,v))g(σ(p,v)) < 0. (42)




[u(v,s) − r − p(ˆ v)]dG(s) − c(ˆ v).( 4 3 )
Incentive compatibility of the contract means U(v,ˆ v) ≤ U(v,v) for all v,ˆ v ∈ [0,1].
We now characterize all incentive compatible contracts in the model. Deﬁne the
client’s indirect payoﬀ function as U(v) ≡ U(v,v).









and p(v) monotonically non-increasing.
We only sketch the proof, and assume diﬀerentiability throughout.














The ﬁrst-order condition of maximizing (43) in ˆ v and obtaining the maximum at
ˆ v = v is
FOC(v,ˆ v)=−p
0(ˆ v)[1− G(σ(p(ˆ v),v))] − c
0(ˆ v)=0for ˆ v = v.
The necessary second-order condition is that ∂FOC(v,ˆ v)/∂ˆ v ≤ 0 at ˆ v = v,e q u i v a -
lently, ∂FOC(v,ˆ v)/∂v ≥ 0 at ˆ v = v,t h a ti s ,
−p
0(v)g(σ(p(v),v)) ≥ 0,
so p(v) is non-increasing.
Suﬃciency: It follows from the ﬁrst-order condition and the single-crossing con-
dition.
Besides incentive compatibility, the indirect payoﬀ function, U(v),m u s ta l s o
satisfy individual rationality (participation),
U(v) ≥ max{v − r, 0}. (45)
It is easy to see that this constraint either binds at v =0 ,o rv =1 ,o rb o t h .T h e
reason is that by equation (44), dU/dv i sb e t w e e n0a n d1 .




{[1 − G(σ(p(v),v))] p(v)+c(v)}dF(v).







[u(v,s) − r]dG(s) − U(v)
¾
dF(v). (46)
The consultant chooses U :[ 0 ,1] → R and p :[ 0 ,1] → R to maximize (46)
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We solve this problem
using optimal control, where the control variable is p, the state variable is U.W ew i l l
ignore the constraint that p is non-increasing and verify it at the end. We will also
ignore the two IR constraints (at v =0and v =1 ) and use them as transversality
conditions to pin down certain parameters at the end.












By Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the derivative of the Hamiltonian with re-




1(v,σ(p(v),v)) = 0. (47)
Also, −∂H/∂U = ˙ µ,t h a ti s ,
µ
0(v)=f(v).( 4 8 )
Integrating (48) gives µ(v)=F(v)−B where B is a constant. Substituting this and








Note that for u(v,s)=v +s,( 4 9 )s i m p l i ﬁes to p(v)=( B −F(v))/f(v). In the case
of a general u function, however, we only have an implicit solution for p(v).
Transversality conditions (corresponding to the IR constraints) pin down the
value of B. Indeed, if U(0) > max{−r,0} then µ(0) = 0 and hence B =0 .I fU(1) >
max{1 − r, 0} then µ(1) = 0 and hence B =1 . Finally, if U(v)=m a x {v − r,0} for
42both v =0and v =1 ,t h e nB ∈ [0,1] is determined by U(0) = 0 and U(1) = 1 − r,









By log-concavity of f, (B−F(v))/f(v) is decreasing in v for all B ∈ [0,1].T h i s ,
and the conditions imposed on u together imply that p(v) as deﬁned by (49), is
weakly decreasing. This is so because if p(v) were weakly increasing at v, then the
ratio on the left-hand side of (49) would be weakly increasing as the denominator is
weakly decreasing in v (as v goes up, if p(v) goes up weakly then u0
1(v,σ(p(v),v))
goes down weakly by Assumptions 2 and 3 imposed on u).
Our main (and perhaps most interesting) result is that the consultant cannot do
better than she does in this mechanism even if she is able to observe s as she reveals
it to the client.
When s is observable by the consultant, we can represent any mechanism where
all types of the client must be served as follows: the client reports his type, v,a n d
pays the consultant d∗(v); the consultant observes s, and instructs him to undertake





(u(v,s) − r) x
∗(ˆ v,s)dG(s) − d
∗(ˆ v).









The second-order condition is that
R
u1(v,s)x∗(v,s)dG(s) is weakly increasing in v.
The consultant’s payoﬀ is the diﬀerence between the social surplus and the























where we used integration by parts to get the second line. Therefore, the consultant’s























We want to maximize W∗ by choosing x∗(v,s) ∈ [0,1] and U∗(0) ∈ R subject
to the type-dependent participation constraint and the second-order conditions of
incentive compatibility. Clearly, in the optimum, for all v ∈ [0,1],x ∗(v,·) must
be a step-function that equals 0 for s<s v and 1 for s>s v,a l m o s te v e r y -
where. If it were not then we could reduce x∗(v,s) on a positive measure of low
s’ sa n di n c r e a s ei to nap o s i t i v em e a s u r eo fh i g hs’s (for a ﬁxed v) without changing
dU∗(v)/dv =
R
u1(v,s)x∗(v,s)dG(s), yet increasing W∗. That is, we could increase
the consultant’s expected payoﬀ while keeping the mechanism incentive compatible,
which is not possible in the optimum.17















The consultant’s expected payoﬀ under unobservable s is given in equation (46).






































dG(s)dF(v) − U(0). (51)
17This result corresponds to Lemma 6 in the model of the paper.
44Note that (50) and (51) are equivalent. Therefore, W∗ is maximized subject to
the incentive and participation constraints by choosing sv = σ(p(v),v) where σ is
deﬁned by (39) and p by (49), and U∗(0) = U(0). It is easy to check that the
suﬃcient conditions of incentive compatibility hold in this mechanism, therefore we
have found the maximum.
We conclude that the solution to the “benchmark” problem, where the consultant
can observe the realization of s, is the same as that of our original problem. This
result corresponds to Theorem 2 in the paper.
A2.3 The additive-correlated model
In this section of the appendix we translate the conditions imposed on the func-
tion u(v,s) ≡ V in the model with orthogonally normalized signals (see Assumptions
1-3 in section A.2) into conditions on the joint distribution of v and the error term,
z ≡ V − v. Recall that the assumptions made on u were easy to interpret, and
meant, roughly speaking, that the client’s original information, v,a n dt h eo r t h o g o -
nal part of the consultant-controlled signal, s, are substitutes in the client’s ex-post
valuation. The conditions imposed on the joint distribution of v and z express ex-
actly the same assumptions. We provide them only for the sake of completeness,
there really is no new insight to be gained from this transformation.
Recall that the conditional cdf of z conditional on v is denoted by Gv,a n di t s




















Since gv > 0, the second line is always positive. As far as the ﬁrst line is








To see this, ﬁx s and deﬁne e z(v) implicitly by s = Gv (e z (v)).D i ﬀerentiating this




∂Gv (e z (v))/∂v
gv (e z (v))
.
On the other hand, G−1








So, from (52) and (53) we can conclude that the assumption that u is increasing in





in the correlated linear model.
From the second line of (52), using the rule for derivatives of inverse functions



















































in the correlated linear model.
From (52) and (53)
∂2u(v,s)
∂v2 = −








































gv (z)∂2Gv (z)/∂v2 − [∂gv (z)/∂v][∂Gv (z)/∂v]
gv (z)(gv (z) − ∂Gv (z)/∂v)
.



















Hence the assumption u11/u1 ≤ u12/u2 in the independent model translates to
−
gv (z)∂2Gv (z)/∂v2 − [∂gv (z)/∂v][∂Gv (z)/∂v]





































Notice that the ﬁrst term is the same on both sides of the inequality. Hence, As-

































The meaning of the latter two conditions, as we discussed above, is the same as that
of Assumptions 2 and 3: The client’s original signal, v,a n dt h ec o m p o n e n to ft h e
error term that is orthogonal to v, are substitutes in V . It seems to us that the
equivalent formulation where the signals are orthogonally normalized (as described
in section A.2.2) show this interpretation much more clearly.
48References
[1] Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989), “Log—concave probability and its applications,”
Working Paper, University of Michigan.
[2] Crawford, P. V., and and J. Sobel (1982), “Strategic Information Transmis-
sion,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6: 1431-1451.
[3] Dana, J. D., and K. E. Spier (1993), “Expertise and Contingent Fees: The
Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation,” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization,V o l .9 ,3 4 9 - 3 6 7 .
[4] Emons, W., “Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts,” RAND Journal of
Economics, Vol. 28, 107-119.
[5] Es˝ o P. and B. Szentes (2002), “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions:
The Handicap Auction,” Northwestern University, CMS-EMS DP#1352.
[6] Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge,
USA
[7] Jullien, Bruno (2000), “Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 1-47.
[8] Klibanoﬀ, P., and J. Morduch (1995), “Decentralization, Externalities, and
Eﬃciency,” Review of Economic Studies, 62, 223-247.
[9] Lewis, T., and D. Sappington (1989), “Countervailing Incentives in Agency
Problems,” Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 294-313.
[10] Maggi, G., and A. Rodriguez (1995), “On Countervailing Incentives,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 66, 238-263.
[11] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1986), “Relying on the Information of Interested
Parties,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol 17, pp. 18-32.
[12] Pitchik, C., and A. Schotter (1987), “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Informa-
tion Transmission,” American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 1032-1036;
Erratum in Vol. 78 (1988), p. 1164.
[13] Prékopa, A. (1971), “Logarithmic concave measures with applications to sto-
chastic programming,” Acta Sci. Math., Szeged, 32, 301-316.
[14] Scotchmer, S., and D. L. Rubinfeld (1990), “Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An
Economic Analysis,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, 343-356.
[15] Wolinsky, A. (1993), “Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services,”
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 380-398.
49